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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. EDMONDSON: EMPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZATION LAWS, STATES' RIGHTS, AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION-AN INFORMED APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Few issues are as divisive in American politics as illegal immigra-
tion. The Republican and Democratic parties are engaged in a virtual
stalemate on the issue, and many would argue that the federal govern-
ment's comprehensive overhaul of immigration law-the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)-has been largely ineffective at
stemming the tide of illegal immigration.' In response, states and mu-
nicipalities have begun to enact statutes that seek to address the problem
by preventing employers from hiring unauthorized workers.2 These stat-
utes raise questions about the extent to which state and local govern-
ments can regulate in the area of immigration without triggering federal
preemption principles. One such example is the recent Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson.3 In
Edmondson, the court analyzed a challenge to the Oklahoma Taxpayer
and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 (the Oklahoma Act), which seeks to
regulate illegal immigration through employment verification.
Part I of this Comment outlines the relevant background informa-
tion regarding the federal regulation of unauthorized workers and pre-
emption doctrine. It also summarizes Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co.,5 which provides a significant framework for determining the exis-
tence of federal preemption.6 Part II summarizes Edmondson, and Part III
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision. This Comment commends the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Edmondson as consistent with federal pre-
emption jurisprudence by arguing that, in conducting its conflict preemp-
tion analysis, the court placed appropriate weight on the goals of IRCA
when analyzing whether the Oklahoma Act was an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of these goals. It then argues that Edmondson, and the
recently decided Third Circuit case Lozano v. City of Hazleton,7 faith-
1. Randall G. Shelley, Jr., If You Want Something Done Right ... : Chicanos Por La Causa
v. Napolitano and the Return of Federalism to Immigration Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 603,612 (2010)
(citing Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007)).
2. Rachel Feller, Comment, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case Study of Ari-
zona's Improper Legislation in the Field of "Immigration-Related Employment Practices ", 84
WASH. L. REV. 289, 302-05 (2009) (stating that twelve states have enacted legislation requiring the
use of E-Verify, while only one has prohibited its use) (citations omitted).
3. 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010).
4. Id. at 750.
5. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
6. Id. at 865.
7. 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010).
375
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
fully employ the implied preemption principles articulated in Geier by
conducting a thorough conflict preemption analysis after concluding that
sections of the state statutes were neither expressly preempted nor field
preempted. These decisions stand in contrast to the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano,8 where the court
largely ignored Geier, and failed to conduct a proper implied preemption
analysis.9 This Comment concludes by discussing the implications of the
Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit decisions on federal and state immigra-
tion laws.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Regulation of Unauthorized Workers
In 1986, Congress enacted IRCA, which created a "comprehensive
scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United
States."' 0 IRCA was the first federal law that sought to decrease illegal
immigration by punishing employers for hiring unauthorized workers."
At the time Congress enacted IRCA, there were approximately three
million illegal immigrants living in the United States.12
In 1942, many of the illegal immigrants in the United States were
temporary farm workers hired due to the lack of agricultural laborers
caused by World War I.13 In response, Congress enacted a temporary-
worker program that allowed employers to hire workers from Mexico for
up to nine months of the year.14 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Ag-
ricultural Act of 1949, which expanded the previous temporary-worker
program to the Bracero Program.' 5 Workers were paid low wages under
the Bracero Program, allowing employers to reap greater profits.16 The
program ended in 1965, but during that sixteen year period, over five
million Mexican workers immigrated legally to the United States.17 In
the wake of the Bracero Program, employers continued to demand cheap
labor, and therefore, continued to hire and employ now illegal immi-
8. 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), cert granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,
130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
9. See id. at 866-67.
10. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
I . Shelley, supra note 1, at 627 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682(l), at 52 (1986)). Prior to 1986,
federal law did not directly prevent employers from hiring unauthorized workers. Kati L. Griffith,
Comment, A Supreme Stretch: The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 128 (2008) (citing HR. REP. No. 99-682(1), at 51-56).
12. Phi Mai Nguyen, Comment, Closing the Back Door on Illegal Immigration: Over Two




15. Id. The Bracero Program was an agreement between the United States and Mexico to
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grants.18 During the 1970s and 1980s, due to the widespread availability
of employment, illegal immigration numbers continued to rise.19 As ille-
gal immigration increased, so too did anti-immigration sentiment.2 0 This
sentiment was compounded by a fragile economy with high unemploy-
ment and rising costs and inflation.21 In response, Congress decided to
combat illegal immigration by eliminating the "pull" factors. 22 In theory,
if eliminated, these "pull" factors-such as increased employment oppor-
tunities and higher wages-would significantly reduce the impetus for
people to enter or remain in the United States illegally.23 In 1986, after
nearly a decade of debate and compromise, Congress passed IRCA, and
24President Reagan signed the bill into law.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that IRCA made prevent-
ing the employment of unauthorized aliens a central "policy of immigra-
tion law." 25 In order to more effectively combat illegal employment,
IRCA established an extensive program, known as 1-9, to confirm the
work eligibility of employees.2 6 Employers are required to verify the
work eligibility of employees by examining specified documents.27 If the
documents appear to be reasonably legitimate, the employer may not
request additional documentation. 28 This provision limits the potential for
29employment discrimination. In addition, employers who "attempt to
comply in good faith" with the requirements of IRCA are exempt from
civil and criminal penalties,30 thus representing Congress's attempt to
lessen the burden of verification on employers and minimize disruption
of business.3 1 Furthermore, IRCA does not require employers to verify
the work eligibility of independent contractors.32
18. Id. at 626.
19. Id.
20. See Adam L. Lounsbury, Comment, A Nationalist Critique of Local Laws Purporting to
Regulate the Hiring of Undocumented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 415, 419 (2008). This anti-
immigrant sentiment was based on the assumption that illegal immigrants negatively impacted the
"economic, social, and political well-being of the nation." Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. The incentives that drive people to enter or remain in the United States illegally are
often referred to as "push" and "pull" factors. Linda Sue Johnson, Comment, The Antidiscrimination
Provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1988). The
"push" factors that cause people to leave their home state include "unemployment, low wages, poor
living and working conditions, a depressed or unstable economy, and internal strife." Id. The "pull"
factors that encourage people to come the United States are "employment opportunities, higher
wages, and better working and living conditions." Id. at 1062-63.
23. See Lounsbury, supra note 20, at 419-20.
24. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1059.
25. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS
v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)).
26. Chamber ofCommerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 751 (10th Cir. 2010).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 767.
30. Id. at 751.
31. Id. at 767.
32. Id. at 751.
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In enacting IRCA, Congress sought to balance several competing
goals: "preventing the hiring of unauthorized aliens, lessening the disrup-
tion of American business, and minimizing the possibility of employ-
ment discrimination."33 Congress also added a provision to IRCA ex-
pressly preempting "any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized ali-
ens." 34
Illegal immigration continued to rise throughout the 1990s.35 Con-
gress, in an attempt to fight this upward trend, sought to create a more
effective and efficient method for verifying employee work authorization
that could be used in conjunction with the 1-9 forms. 36 In 1996, Congress
passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA)37 which, among other things, created another employment veri-
fication system-the Basic Pilot Program (E-Verify). 3 8 E-Verify differs
from 1-9 in that it is an internet based system in which information is
submitted electronically, and the government then checks the employee's
information against an electronic database. 3 9 Congress, however, explic-
itly refused to require most employers to use E-Verify, rendering it an
entirely voluntary alternative to I-9.40 According to the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, in 2001, just over one thousand employers used
E-Verify, but by 2010, over two hundred thousand employers partici-
pated.4 1
B. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption Doctrine
The Supremacy Clause states that the Constitution and the laws of
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing."42 The Clause has long been interpreted as providing that federal law
33. Id. at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 765 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
35. See Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing
OffSteam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 301 (2009).
36. See Naomi Barrowclough, Note, E-Verify: The Long Awaited "Magic Bullet" or Weak
Attempt to Substitute Technology for Comprehensive Reform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 791, 797
(2010).
37. Id.
38. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S.Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115)..
In 2007, the Basic Pilot Program was renamed "E-Verify." History and Milestones, U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov
/e-verify (found under "About the Program" sub-menu).
39. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 752. E-Verify compares information from the employee's 1-9
forms to data from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Social Security Administration
records to determine employment eligibility. Id.
40. Id. at 768. E-Verify, however, is mandatory for many federal contractors. Id. at 772.
41. History and Milestones, supra note 38.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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preempts contrary state laws.43 Arising out of Supremacy Clause juris-
prudence, preemption doctrine delineates the boundaries of federal su-
premacy when Congress has enacted legislation, which is otherwise
within its enumerated powers.44 The preemption inquiry "starts with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be su-
perseded by . . . Federal Act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."45 Therefore, one must look to Congressional intent for
enacting a statute to determine if a state law is preempted.
Federal preemption can be either express or implied.46 Express pre-
emption exists "when Congress 'define[s] explicitly the extent to which
its enactments pre-empt state law."' 47 Some federal statutes exempt state
law that would otherwise be expressly preempted by way of a savings
clause.48 There are two types of implied preemption: field preemption
and conflict preemption. 49 Field preemption occurs when "the scope of a
statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field
exclusively."50 Conflict preemption occurs when a state law would make
it impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where state
law "stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."51 Furthermore, when state and
federal laws share a common goal, "[t]he fact of a common end hardly
neutralizes conflicting means[,]" and the foregoing preemption principles
still apply.52
C. Geier v. American Honda Motor Company
One of the Supreme Court's most recent and significant pro-
nouncements on the preemption of state law is Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co. In Geier, the Court held that a state tort law claim conflicted
with the objectives of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208
(FMVSS 208), and therefore was impliedly preempted.53 The case com-
menced after one plaintiff was seriously injured in an auto collision.54
The 1987 Honda Accord that the plaintiff was driving was not equipped
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405-06 (1819).
44. Sandra Zellmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1659, 1665 (2009).
45. Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
46. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
47. Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d
788, 792 (10th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See Zellmer, supra note 44, at 1661, 1668.
49. Id. at 1666.
50. Sprictsma v. Mercury, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
51. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fid.
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
52. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 766 (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 379 (2000)).
53. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000).
54. Id. at 865.
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with an airbag.5 5 The plaintiffs sought damages under District of Colum-
bia tort law, claiming that Honda was negligent by not equipping the car
with an airbag.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) promulgated FMVSS 208
pursuant to its power under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Transportation Act (Safety Act).57 The Court concluded that the Safety
Act's express preemption provision, when read with its savings clause,
excluded common law tort actions. However, the Court noted that a
savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
principles."5 In addition, the Court emphasized that it "has repeatedly
'decline[d] to give broad effect to savings clauses where doing so would
upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."'60 Fur-
thermore, the Court declined to find that the existence of a saving clause
or express preemption provision would create a "special burden" disfa-
1 61voring preemption.
Having concluded that the state tort law action was not expressly
preempted, the Court then addressed whether the suit was impliedly pre-
empted by FMVSS 208.62 Although the purpose of FMVSS 208 was to
improve automobile safety, it did not require the installation of airbags.63
The Court explained that FMVSS 208 was not a safety floor, but was
developed as a way to give automobile manufacturers a range of choices
among different passive restraint systems, all of which promoted FMVSS
208's safety objectives.64 Therefore, by requiring airbags and taking the
choice away from the auto makers, the state tort law stood as an obstacle
to the accomplishment of FMVSS 208's objective.
The Court gave significant weight to the history of FMVSS 208 and
DOT's explanation of FMVSS 208 in concluding that the state tort action
was conflict preempted.66 The Court deferred to DOT's explanation be-
cause of the technical nature of the subject matter and the complex and
extensive historical background of FMVSS 208.67 The Court added, "The
agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation
and its objectives and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id. at 864.
58. Id at 868.
59. Id. at 869.
60. Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-07 (2000)) (alteration in
original).
61. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
62. Id at 874.
63. Id. at 874-76.
64. Id. at 874-75.
65. Id. at 886.
66. Id. at 875-77.
67. Id. at 883.
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impact of state requirements."6 In sum, Geier provided the appropriate
framework with which to analyze whether state and local immigration
laws are preempted by federal law.
II. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. EDMONDSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 2007, Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen
Protection Act (the Oklahoma Act) to regulate illegal immigration.69 The
Oklahoma Act reflects the judgment of the Oklahoma legislature that
"illegal immigration is causing economic hardship and lawlessness
... ,70 The Oklahoma Act seeks to prevent illegal immigration by stop-
ping the employment of illegal aliens through the use of mandatory veri-
71fication systems and various monetary disincentives.
Numerous chambers of commerce and trade associations brought
suit challenging three sections of the Oklahoma Act: Sections 7(B), 7(C),
and 9.72 Section 7(B) requires employers to use E-Verify to confirm the
employment status of their employees.73 If an employer refuses to use E-
Verify it is barred from contracting with Oklahoma public employers.74
Section 7(C) "makes it a 'discriminatory practice' for any employer to
'discharge an employee working in Oklahoma who is a United States
citizen or permanent resident alien while retaining an employee who the
employing entity knows, or reasonably should have known, is an unau-
thorized alien."' 75 "An employer who engages in such a discriminatory
practice may be investigated by the Oklahoma Human Rights Commis-
sion" (OHRC) and can be subject to temporary injunctive relief "and
affirmative relief, including reinstatement, back pay, costs and attorney's
fees." 76 However, if an employer uses E-Verify, it is exempt from liabil-
ity under Section 7(C).77 Section 9 requires all employers to obtain
"documentation to verify . . . independent contractor[s'] employment
authorization."78 If the independent contractor does not provide proof of
work authorization, then the employer must withhold compensation
equal to "the top marginal income tax rate" allowable under Oklahoma
68. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,496 (1996)).
69. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 750, 750 (10th Cir. 2010).
70. Id. at 753 (quoting Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, 2007 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 112, § 2 (West)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 753-55.
72. Id. at 750.
73. Id. at 753-54.
74. Id
75. Id. at 754 (citing Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 25, § 1313(C)(1) (2007)).
76. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 754.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 754-55 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit., § 2385.32 (2007)) (alterations in original).
2011] 38 1
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law. 79 Employers who do not withhold the required amount shall be li-
able to the state for the remaining amount.80
The plaintiffs claimed that all three sections of the Oklahoma Act
were expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, and therefore
sought a preliminary injunction.8' The defendants opposed the injunction
and moved to dismiss on the basis that the chambers lacked standing,
certain defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) stripped the district court of ju-
risdiction to enjoin Section 9.82 The district court denied the motion to
dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction as to all three sections. 8 3
B. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction with regard to Sections 7(C) and 9, but reversed the district
court's grant of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Sec-
tion 7(B).84 First, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the three sections of the Oklahoma Act.85 In finding standing,
the court stated that the chambers had sufficiently demonstrated that the
injury threatened by the three sections was "real, immediate, and di-
rect[,]" and that the injunction requested would redress their alleged inju-
ries.86 Second, the court concluded that the Attorney General was not
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as to Section 7(B), but
that he was immune from suit as to Sections 9 and 7(C) because he was
not authorized to enforce those sections.87 Third, the court found that the
TIA did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Section 9.88
It stated that the Oklahoma Act fell outside of the scope of the TIA be-
cause Section 9 was an assessment seeking to regulate illegal immigra-
tion and not a tax with the primary purpose of raising revenue.89 Last, the
court undertook a preemption analysis to determine whether the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction as to the three sections was
proper.90 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court regarding Sections
7(C) and 9, finding that Section 7(C) was expressly preempted and Sec-
tion 9 was impliedly preempted. 9' The court, however, reversed the dis-
79. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 754-755 (quoting § 2385.32(A)).
80. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 755.




85. Id. at 759.
86. Id. at 756 (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008)).
87. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 759-60.
88. Id. at 761.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 764.
91. Id. at 771.
382 [Vol. 88:2
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trict court's decision as to Section 7(B), finding that the section was nei-
ther expressly nor impliedly preempted by federal law. 92
The court began its preemption analysis by evaluating whether the
three provisions of the Oklahoma Act were expressly preempted. 93 Judge
Lucero stated that the proper express preemption analysis asks "whether
the state law at issue falls within the scope of a federal preemption provi-
sion."94 "IRCA preempts 'any State law imposing civil or criminal sanc-
tions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized ali-
ens."' 95 The court noted that IRCA does not define "sanction" as requir-
96
ing a punitive component.
The court determined that the penalties under Section 7(C) for firing
a legal worker while retaining an illegal worker-cease and desist orders,
reinstatement, back pay costs, and attorney's fees-are restrictive meas-
ures that fall within the definition of sanctions under § 1324a(h)(2) of
IRCA.97 The court added that the above penalties are consistent with the
generally accepted use of the term "sanctions" under federal law.9 8
Therefore, because these sanctions are imposed upon those who employ
illegal aliens, Section 7(C) falls within the scope of § 1324a(h)(2) and is
thus expressly preempted. 99
Conversely, the court concluded that Sections 7(B) and 9 were not
expressly preempted by § 1324a(h)(2) because neither "impos[es] civil
or criminal sanctions . . . upon those who employ . . . unauthorized ali-
ens." 00 Section 7(B) simply requires all employers to use E-Verify.10
An employer violates this section not by employing illegal immigrants,
but by refusing to implement the program. 102 According to the court,
because sanctions are distinct from the employment of unauthorized ali-
ens, this section does not come within the scope of § 1324a(h)(2) and
therefore is not expressly preempted. 0 3 Likewise, under Section 9, it is
irrelevant whether an independent contractor is an unauthorized alien.1 04
Under that provision the employer must verify the work status or with-
hold taxes of all independent contractors. 05
92. Id.
93. Id. at 765.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)).
96. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 765.
97. Id. at 765-66.
98. Id. at 765.
99. Id. at 766.
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Having found that Sections 9 and 7(B) were not expressly pre-
empted, the court set out to determine whether the sections were none-
theless impliedly preempted based on conflict preemption principles.106 It
concluded that, although Section 9 did not make compliance with federal
law a physical impossibility, it did stand as an obstacle to accomplishing
the goals of IRCA and therefore was conflict preempted. o0 However, the
panel split in concluding that Section 7(B), which mandates the use of E-
Verify, was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's goals
under IRCA and therefore was not preempted.108
In its preemption analysis regarding Section 9, the court found that,
although this section did not make compliance with IRCA an impossibil-
ity, it stood as an obstacle to the implementation of IRCA because it in-
terfered with the methods chosen by Congress and therefore was conflict
preempted. 09 Specifically, Section 9 requires employers to verify the
work authorization of independent contractors.o10 In contrast, IRCA ex-
plicitly excludes independent contractors from verification require-
ments."' The court noted that this added requirement stood contrary to
the goals of IRCA by potentially exposing employers to federal liability
for employment discrimination and increasing burdens on businesses.112
In addition, Geier also supported the court's conflict preemption conclu-
sion.11 3 The court noted that "Section 9 would create obligations on con-
tracting entities that Congress expressly chose not to impose."1 14 Just as
state tort law could not hold automakers liable for not installing an airbag
in Geier, Oklahoma should not be allowed to require the verification of
independent contractors. 1 15
The last part of the court's preemption analysis addressed the Ninth
Circuit case of Chicanos Por La Causa v. Napolitano."6 In Chicanos, the
court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) was neither
106. Id. at 766-67.
107. Id. at 769.
108. See id. at 771. Judge Lucero argued that Section 7(B) is conflict preempted because mak-
ing E-Verify mandatory would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress goals in
enacting IRCA. Id. at 768-70. He stated that Congress has concluded that 1-9 "strikes the best bal-
ance between preventing employment of unauthorized workers, easing burdens on employers, and
preventing employment discrimination." Id. at 768. Furthermore, Judge Lucero analogized mandat-
ing E-Verify to mandating airbags in Geier; Oklahoma should not be allowed to mandate the use of
E-Verify because it is voluntary under federal law and mandating its use would restrict employers'
choices. Id. at 769-70.
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expressly nor implied preempted by IRCA or the IIRIRA." 7 Like the
Oklahoma Act, LAWA was intended to combat illegal immigration by
targeting employers who knowingly hire illegal immigrants." 8 The prin-
cipal sanction of LAWA was the revocation of state business licenses.1 9
The Arizona law also mandated the use of E-Verify.120 The Tenth Circuit
reasoned that Oklahoma's reliance on Chicanos was misplaced because
the provision at issue in that case was a licensing law, and Oklahoma had
not asserted that its law is a licensing law.121 Most significantly, how-
ever, the Tenth Circuit opined that the Ninth Circuit's implied preemp-
tion holding was based largely on the Ninth Circuit's initial conclusion
that LAWA fell within the savings clause of IRCA. 122 The Tenth Circuit
expressed reservation with the ruling, stating it "is problematic because it
implies that the presence of an express preemption provision precludes
the possibility of implied preemption."123 The court was "unpersuaded"
by the Ninth Circuit's holding because its approach stood contrary to
Geier and generally accepted implied preemption principles.' 2 4
Last, the court evaluated the remaining factors for granting a pre-
liminary injunction.125 It found that the plaintiffs would likely suffer ir-
reparable harm absent a preliminary injunction as any monetary damages
imposed would be unlikely to be recovered due to the government's sov-
ereign immunity.126 Additionally, the balance of equities tipped in the
chambers' favor because an injunction would serve the public interest
and Oklahoma does not have a public interest in enforcing a law that is
likely unconstitutional.127
C. Concurrence
The concurring opinion, authored by Judge Kelly, offered an expla-
nation as to why Section 7(B) was not conflict preempted.128 Judge Kelly
argued, despite E-Verify's voluntary use on the national scale, "it is not
reasonable to assume that a mandatory program choice for state public
contractors conflicts with Congressional purpose."' 29 Judge Kelly opined
117. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860-61 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
The court also held that LAWA did not violate the employers' rights to due process. Id. at 861.
118. Id. at 860.
119. Id.
120. Id.




125. Id. The plaintiffs would have had to demonstrate "a likelihood that they will suffer irrepa-
rable harm absent preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that the
injunction is in the public interest." Id (citing Attorney General v. Tyson Food, Inc. 565 F.3d 769,
776 (10th Cir. 2009)).
126. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 770.
127. Id. at 771.
128. Id. (Kelly, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 772.
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that Congress had foreseen the increased use of technology as evidenced
by requiring E-Verify for federal contractors.130 The concurrence con-
cluded "choice is not an end in itself and no evidence suggests that fed-
eral standards concerning immigration and employment-verification will
be compromised by E-Verify."l31
D. Dissent
The dissent, authored by Judge Hartz, argued three points. First, the
plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an injunction, as to Section 7(B),
against the Attorney General because they failed to show an actual and
imminent threat of injury traceable to him.' 32 Second, the dissent con-
tended that the TIA barred the chambers' Section 9 claim because the
TIA bars injunctions against tax-withholding statutes, and Section 9 is a
tax withholding statute.133 Additionally, the dissent argued that it is as
reasonable to infer that the purpose of Section 9 is to protect the integrity
of the tax system as to infer its purpose is to enforce immigration law.134
Third, Judge Hartz concurred with the other judges regarding the injunc-
tion of Section 7(C), but on narrower grounds.'3 5 He contended that rein-
statement, back pay, costs, and attorney fees are not civil sanctions under
IRCA, but rather, compensatory relief, which IRCA does not cover.' 3 6
However, because Section 7(C) imposes other civil fines that do come




Part A of the analysis argues that the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Edmondson was consistent with the three goals of IRCA: preventing
employment of unauthorized workers, preventing employment discrimi-
nation, and minimizing disruption of business. 3 8 Specifically, Section 9,
independent contractor obligations, conflicted with the goals of IRCA
and was preempted; whereas Section 7(B), which mandates the use of E-
Verify, does not conflict with the goals of IRCA, and therefore, the court
was correct in holding that it was not preempted by federal law. Part B of
the analysis contends that the Edmondson court more accurately and
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (Hartz, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. at 774.
134. Id. at 776-77. It is worth noting that Judge Hartz believed that the majority wrongly relied
on the motive behind the enactment of the Oklahoma Act in arriving at their conclusion that Section
9 imposed an assessment and not a tax and therefore was outside of the scope of the TIA. Id. at 776.
If more judges put aside motive in determining whether a state enactment imposed an assessment or
a tax, more states could disguise efforts to control immigration as tax laws, which are immune from
injunction. However, implied preemption principles would likely still bar many of these enactments.
135. Id. at 777.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
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faithfully applied the principles of implied preemption than did the Ninth
Circuit in Chicanos. The Ninth Circuit largely ignored the implied pre-
emption framework articulated in Geier by failing to place appropriate
weight on the goals of IRCA. Finally, Part C of the analysis discusses the
possible implications of the circuit courts' decisions on state and federal
immigration laws, and the soon to be issued Supreme Court ruling on the
constitutionality of LAWA.
A. Edmondson: True to the Goals oflRCA
When Congress enacted IRCA it sought to delicately balance three
goals: preventing employment of unauthorized workers, preventing em-
ployment discrimination, and preventing undue disruption of business.' 39
In Edmondson, the Tenth Circuit carefully considered each of these goals
in arriving at its decision that Section 9 was conflict preempted, while
Section 7(B) was not. The result was an informed holding that demon-
strated a superior approach to immigration and employment that was
faithful to Congressional intent.
1. Section 9 Was Conflict Preempted
The court properly concluded that Section 9, which requires em-
ployers to verify the worker authorization of independent contractors,
was conflict preempted. As the defendants argued, both the Oklahoma
Act and IRCA share a common goal of preventing unauthorized em-
ployment.140 However, although requiring employers to verify the work
eligibility of independent contractors would potentially further the goal
of preventing unauthorized workers, Section 9 runs completely counter
to the other two avowed goals of IRCA: preventing the disruption of
business and minimizing the possibility of employment discrimination.
The construction industry provides an apt example. In order to
complete a construction project, a general contractor (employer) will
often hire independent contractors to perform work that the general con-
tractor does not specialize in. 14 By requiring the general contractor to
verify the work authorization of each independent contractor, the hiring
process would slow considerably. Either individuals would have to be
taken away from their normal employment duties or the employer would
need to hire additional employees to verify the work authorization of
independent contractors. Either option results in the disruption of busi-
139. Id.
140. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 767 (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
379 (2000)).
141. See Kent W. Collier, Comment, The Nuts and Bolts of Bankruptcy, Trust Funds, and the
Construction Industry: Building a Solution for Subcontractors "Nailed" with an Unpaid Bill, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 623, 624 (2005). The terms "subcontractor" and "independent contractor"
are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., David F. Johnson, Employers' Liability for Independent
Contractors'Injuries, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2000).
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ness-falling behind schedule and paying additional employees both
result in increased costs for the employer.14 2
In order to avoid this disruption of business, employers will likely
resort to hiring those they know are authorized to work.14 3 Although pre-
venting the hiring of unauthorized aliens is one of the goals of IRCA, this
objective comes with an increased risk of employment discrimination. In
drafting IRCA, Congress took great pains to ensure that the new regula-
tory scheme did not increase discrimination. 1" For example, IRCA ex-
plicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship status or na-
tional origin,14 5 and if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that an employer has engaged in a discriminatory practice, the employer
may be subject to fines ranging from $100 to $10,000 for each act of
discrimination. 14 6 IRCA, therefore, imposes similar liability for hiring
unauthorized workers and discriminating against authorized aliens.1 47 In
contrast, Section 9 and the Oklahoma Act do not contain a provision
imposing liability on those who discriminate against authorized aliens.148
In and of itself, the failure to incorporate an anti-discrimination provision
does not necessarily mean that Section 9 conflicts with IRCA; however,
by requiring the verification of independent contractors, Section 9 poten-
tially exposes employers to federal liability as they strive to comply with
the additional state requirement. 149 Surely, federal liability qualifies as a
disruption of business.
In Edmondson, the court downplayed the foregoing argument by
noting that, in order to incur federal liability, an employer must act with
a specific intent to discriminate.15 0 Under Section 9, this possibility is not
far-fetched. For example, in many areas of business, contracts are
awarded through the use of a bidding system. 51 Typically, in this system,
the lowest bidder is awarded the contract.152 An employer would have a
strong incentive under Section 9 to award the contract not necessarily to
the lowest bidder, but to the independent contractor whose work eligibil-
ity could most easily be verified. It is not hard to imagine that under this
142. These employers would also need to confirm the work authorization of new hires, which
would further disrupt business.
143. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 217 (3d Cir. 2010) ("While drafting IRCA,
Congress heard testimony that imposing employer sanctions would create economic incentives for
employers to discriminate against workers who appeared to be of foreign origin.").
144. Patrick S. Cunningham, Comment, The Legal Arizona Worker's Act: A Threat to Federal
Supremacy Over Immigration?, 42 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 411, 416 (2010).
145. Id. at 417.
146. Id.
147. Id. The penalties for hiring an unauthorized worker range from $250 to $10,000. Id. at
415.
148. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 754-55 (10th Cir. 2010).
149. Id. at 769.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Janine McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' Liability
in Construction Bidding Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 387, 391 (1985).
152. See, e.g., id
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system, independent contracting companies owned and staffed by mi-
norities or recent immigrants would have less opportunity to win a con-
tract than a white-owned business.'5 3 In the alternative, if the employer
opted for withholding taxes instead of verifying eligibility, this again
would disrupt business by creating a larger financial burden on the em-
ployer-as the employer would still need to pay the contractor their
original compensation and simultaneously set aside additional monies for
the tax withholding. Additionally, Section 9 could lead to increased liti-
gation between general contractors and subcontractors regarding contract
disputes to determine which entity bore the financial burden for the
withholding. Because Section 9 would significantly disrupt the balance
of goals Congress sought to achieve in enacting IRCA, the court cor-
rectly concluded Section 9 was too large an obstacle and was therefore
conflict preempted.154
2. Section 7(B) Was Not Impliedly Preempted
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Section 7(B), which requires
the use of E-Verify, was not conflict preempted by IRCA gave proper
weight to state sovereignty while not disturbing the goals of IRCA. The
Third Circuit, in Lozano, and Judge Lucero concluded otherwise.'55 Yet,
their arguments are less persuasive because state mandated use of E-
Verify does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the goals
of IRCA.' 56
a. E-Verify Will Not Disrupt Business
Mandating the use of E-Verify will not disrupt business. One of
Congress's goals in establishing E-Verify was to make the work authori-
zation of employees more efficient.'5 7 To verify an employee's eligibility
using E-Verify, all the employer must do is electronically submit the
employee's information over the internet and wait for a confirmation.'
If the employee information matches the government records, the gov-
ernment instantly notifies the employer of the employee's eligibility.
This process certainly does not require more time than examining docu-
153. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1069 ("A primary reason for the opposition to the employer
sanctions scheme [of IRCA] was the concern that some employers, when threatened with civil and
criminal sanctions for hiring undocumented aliens, would discriminate against those applicants who
share a number of characteristics with those immigrant groups most commonly perceived as ille-
gal.").
154. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 769.
155. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210 (3d Cir. 2010); Edmondson, 594 F.3d at
768-69.
156. At issue in Lozano was a Pennsylvania town's licensing law that sought to reduce illegal
immigration through, inter alia, the mandatory use of E-Verify. 620 F.3d at 177-79.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ments under the 1-9 system. 6 0 If, on the other hand, the employer re-
ceives a non-confirmation, it is required to do nothing aside from alerting
the employee of the non-confirmation.i In fact, the employer is man-
dated to take no action against the employee pending an appeal of the
non-confirmation, which must be initiated by the employee.1 62 Addition-
ally, a recent study of E-Verify conducted by an independent research
company, Westat, found that "employers are generally satisfied with the
program and feel it is non-burdensome."l 6 3
The Third Circuit contended that mandating the use of E-Verify
would increase costs to businesses in the form of set-up and training ex-
penses.'1 This additional burden is de minimus. First, the vast majority
of businesses have computers and access to the internet. Second, it is
estimated that the average implementation cost is $125 and the average
yearly cost is under $750, with three-fourths of the employers spending
less than $100.165 The burden imposed by mandating E-Verify does not
pose a tangible obstacle to the goal of minimizing the disruption of busi-
ness.
b. E-Verify Will Not Cause Increased Employment Discrimi-
nation
The mandatory use of E-Verify will not lead to increased employ-
ment discrimination. E-Verify provides sufficient safeguards against
discrimination through its appeals process and as evidenced by the fact
that Congress mandates its use for federal contractors.1 6 6 If the employer
receives a tentative non-conformation, the employee is notified and then
has eight business days to contest the tentative non-confirmation.167 Dur-
ing this period, the employer may not take any adverse action against the
employee.168 Furthermore, because the employer is shielded from liabil-
ity during this period, there is no impetus for it to discriminate against
the employee. 16 9
The Lozano court argued that E-Verify's unreliability will lead to
increased discrimination.17 0 The decision cites a 2007 congressional
160. Id. at 751.
161. Id. at 752.
162. Id.
163. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERvs., WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY
PROGRAM: USCIS SYNOPSIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%2ODocs/Westat%2OEvaluation%20of%2Othe%20E-
Verify%20Program.pdf.
164. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. Shelley, supra note 1, at 623-24.
166. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008).




170. Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 620 F.3d 170, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2010).
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study that found foreign-born workers are thirty times more likely to
receive tentative non-confirmations than employees born in the United
States.17 1 Tentative non-confirmations, however, do not affect the final
determination of eligibility,172 and because the employer may not take
action during the appeals period, this non-confirmation will not result in
discrimination. Indeed, Congress has repeatedly refused to mandate the
use of E-Verify for the vast majority of employers,1 73 but nonetheless,
many businesses that contract with the federal government are required
to use the system.174 In 2008, President Bush issued an executive order
directing all federal departments and agencies to require federal contrac-
tors and subcontractors to verify the work authorization of employees
performing work under qualifying federal contracts. 75 The particulars of
the order are complex, but in short, all federal contractors and subcon-
tractors are required to use E-Verify with the following exceptions: con-
tracts for fewer than 120 days; contracts less than $100,000; contracts
where all work is performed outside of the United States; and commer-
cially off-the-shelf items and related services, which includes nearly all
food and agricultural products.176
President Obama has pledged his support to implement this execu-
tive order 77 and has committed significant budget funds toward improv-
ing and expanding E-Verify.17 8 There also appears to be bipartisan sup-
port in Congress for mandating the use of E-Verify for federal contrac-
tors and subcontractors.' 79 As a proportion of the total national work
force, federal contractors may not amount to much, but between January
2011 and the end of March 2011 the list of federal contractors with five
or more employees enrolled in E-Verify totaled nearly 2,500 pages. so By
171. Id. at 215.
172. See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 752.
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id.
175. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008). The executive order took
effect September 8, 2009. "Federal contractors and subcontractors will be required to begin using the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' E-Verify system starting September 8, 2009, to verify
their employees' eligibility to legally work in the United States." Federal Contractors Required to
Use E- Verify System, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
Office%2Oof%20Communications/Press%2OReleases/FY%2009/Septembe 0 /o202009/far-rule-I -sep-
09.pdf (last updated Jun. 4, 2009).
176. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed Reg. 33,285 (June 6, 2008).
177. Secretary Napolitano Strengthens Employment Verification with Administration's Com-
mitment to E-Verify, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 8, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
releases/pr 1247063976814.shtm.
178. In 2010, the Presidential Budget contained $110 million for E-Verify. OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 72 (2009). The 2011
budget has allocated $137 million for E-Verify and a similar work authorization program. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov'T 82 (2010).
179. See Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Revives Bush Idea to Catch Illegal Workers, WASH. POST,
July 9, 2009, A4.
180. E-Verify Federal Contractors List "Updated", U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.
(Aug. 30, 2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify%
20from%20Controlled%20Vocabulary/E-VerifyFedContrListandQueryVol.pdf.
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mandating the use of E-Verify for federal contractors, the federal gov-
ernment has implicitly, yet strongly, rejected the argument that the sys-
tem is an obstacle to limiting employment discrimination. Last, it is im-
portant to note that Congress has repeatedly extended E-Verify and has
expanded its availability to all 50 states. 81 It seems doubtful that Con-
gress and the Executive Branch would make such a concerted effort to
proliferate the use of E-Verify if they believed that E-Verify conflicts
with the goals of IRCA.
The federal government actively pursues affirmative action pro-
grams designed to increase minority participation in federal business.182
Under the Small Business Act (SBA), the federal government seeks to
increase the number of federal contracts awarded to small businesses
"owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals."' 83 The act defines socially disadvantaged individuals as those
individuals who "have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or
cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without
regard to their individual qualities."' 84 In order to increase the participa-
tion of disadvantaged businesses in federal contracting, the SBA set a
"government-wide goal for the minimum participation of disadvantaged
business enterprises . . . at five percent of the value of all federal gov-
ernment prime contract and subcontract awards in a given year."' 85 In
addition to this government-wide goal, the SBA requires that each fed-
eral agency establish an annual goal that realistically reflects the maxi-
mum potential percentage of contracts that could be awarded to disad-
vantaged businesses.'86
It is paradoxical, if not utterly illogical, that the federal government
would promote the participation of minority owned businesses in federal
contracting through the SBA, yet, it would discourage the hiring of mi-
nority employees through the mandatory use of E-Verify for federal con-
tractors. Potentially, a minority owned business that benefits from the
SBA could then be required to discriminate against minority workers
using E-Verify. Such a contradictory situation can only lead to one con-
clusion; the use of E-Verify does not conflict with IRCA's goal of reduc-
ing employment discrimination.
c. E-Verify Will Help Prevent Unauthorized Workers
States requiring the use of E-Verify will likely further the goal of
preventing unauthorized workers more effectively than the 1-9 system.
181. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 200 (3d Cir. 2010).
182. Brian C. Eades, Casenote, Affirmative Action: The United States Supreme Court Goes
Color-Blind: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 771, 771 (1996).
183. Id. at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6) (1995)).
184. Eades, supra note 182, at 773 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (1995)).
185. Eades, supra note 182, at 773-74.
186. Id. at 774.
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One of the goals of Congress in creating E-Verify was to create a system
that would more accurately verify an employee's eligibility for employ-
ment. As discussed above, E-Verify is not perfect, but it does have
advantages over 1-9 for determining employee eligibility. E-Verify has
"reduced unauthorized employment among participating employers by
permitting employers to determine whether the information provided by
employees on 1-9 forms is consistent with the information on [Social
Security Administration] and [Department of Homeland Security] data-
bases."188 Without this additional verification method, employees can
easily forge documents because employers have no way of determining
their authenticity aside from their outward appearance.189 Furthermore,
one study found that E-Verify returns a tentative non-confirmation for
approximately ten percent of the requests.' 90 Out of the ten percent that
received tentative non-confirmations, few appealed the determination.'91
Of course, the failure to appeal could be due in part to factors aside from
the employee's work authorization status, but at least anecdotally, this
statistic would indicate the system is preventing unauthorized workers.
d. Section 7(B) is Not Conflict Preempted According to Geier
The conclusion that Section 7(B) was not conflict preempted is in
accordance with the preemption analysis in Geier. In that case, DOT's
decision not to require airbags was part of a deliberate and careful regu-
latory scheme.192 DOT even considered an "all airbag" standard, but
opted for a "gradual phase-in of passive restraints."'93 The agency found
that giving automakers a choice of several restraints was best in the
short-term and the long-term to accomplish its goals. 9 4 DOT stated that
allowing a choice in passive restraint systems "would help develop data
on comparative effectiveness, would allow the industry to overcome the
safety problems and high production costs associated with airbags, and
would facilitate the development of alternative, cheaper, and safer pas-
sive restraint systems. And it would build public confidence." 9 5 In short,
"safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative
protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in
every car."' 96
At first glance, the Third Circuit's and Judge Lucero's analogy ap-
pears sound: refusing to allow employers to choose their work verifica-
187. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010).
188. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Servs., Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program, June 2004, at 3).
189. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 751.
190. Shelley, supra note 1, at 631.
191. Id
192. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875 (2000).
193. Id. at 879.
194. Id. at 878-79.
195. Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 881 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 25 (No. 98-1811)).
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tion method is the same as negating automakers' passive restraint choice
by requiring airbags. However, the voluntariness of E-Verify was not due
to calculated assessments like in Geier. For example, Congress made no
equivalent statement that the goals of IRCA would best be promoted by a
choice of verification systems instead of one. 19 7 To the contrary, Con-
gress strongly encouraged the use of E-Verify by expanding its duration
and extending its availability to all fifty states.198 There is also a strong
textual argument against conflict preemption. Congress could have for-
bid states from making E-Verify mandatory, as it did with regard to state
civil and criminal penalties under IRCA's express preemption provision,
but opted not to do so.'" Because E-Verify furthers the goals of IRCA, it
does not raise significant conflict preemption concerns.
B. IRCA, Geier, and the Circuit Split
In Edmondson, the Tenth Circuit more accurately and faithfully ap-
plied the principles of implied preemption than did the Ninth Circuit in
Chicanos. There, the Ninth Circuit concluded that LAWA was not ex-
pressly preempted because, as a licensing law, it fell within the savings
clause of IRCA. 200 The court determined that the mandatory use of E-
Verify and LAWA's potentially harsh sanctions20 1 were not impliedly
preempted because they were not an obstacle to the accomplishment of
202
the goals of IRCA. The Edmondson court distinguished the two cases,
because at issue in Chicanos was a licensing law and the Oklahoma Act
was not a licensing law. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit opined that it
found the Ninth Circuit's reasoning unpersuasive. After concluding that
LAWA was not expressly preempted, and then by conducting a cursory
implied preemption analysis, the Chicanos approach suggested that the
presence of an express preemption provision or savings clause prevents
the operation of implied preemption principles. This inferior approach
stands in opposition to the approach taken in Geier, where the Supreme
197. See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 752 (10th Cir. 2010).
198. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2009), cert
granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (June 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 864. The savings clause states that IRCA preempts all state sanctions "other than
through licensing and similar laws." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)). Furthermore, the
Court found that the savings clause should not have been narrowly interpreted because the power to
regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens has traditionally been left to the states. Chicanos,
558 F.3d at 864-65. This presumption against preemption in the area of employment of unauthorized
aliens is debatable, but nonetheless the existence of a presumption against preemption does not
negate the need to conduct a robust implied preemption analysis. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 768-69
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
201. LAWA imposes a graduated series of sanctions for violations. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 862.
The first infraction "requires the employer to terminate the employment of all unauthorized aliens,
file quarterly reports of all new hires for a probationary period, and file an affidavit stating that it
terminated all unauthorized aliens and will not intentionally or knowingly hire any others." Id. If the
employer violates the act during this probationary period the employer's business license is perma-
nently revoked. Id.
202. Id. at 866.
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Court conducted a thorough conflict preemption analysis after conclud-
ing that the claim was not expressly preempted.
In Geier, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the existence of a
savings clause "does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption
principles."203 After concluding that the express preemption provision of
IRCA saved LAWA, the Ninth Circuit appeared to largely ignore this
maxim of federal preemption doctrine. In concluding that LAWA was
not conflict preempted, the Ninth Circuit downplayed the potential for
conflict between the Arizona law and IRCA by stating "a hypothetical
situation in which an employer may be subject to conflicting rulings
from state and federal tribunals on the basis of the same hiring decision .
does not provide an adequate basis to sustain a facial challenge."204
The court concluded that, because a claim had not yet been brought un-
der LAWA, there was no record to demonstrate the effect of the act on
an employer. Therefore, the argument was essentially speculative and did
not create an implied conflict. 205
The Ninth Circuit's wait-and-see approach runs contrary to the ap-
proach taken in Edmondson. The Edmondson court concluded that Sec-
tion 9 was conflict preempted and that the potential risk of increased
liability was enough for an injunction when the law "upsets Congress'
carefully constructed balance by interfering with its chosen methods."206
IRCA exhaustively details a specialized regulatory scheme, and clearly,
sanctions are an important tool in the scheme.207 Because it is clear from
the text of the legislation that LAWA's sanctions stand as an obstacle to
the goals Congress sought to achieve in creating IRCA's sanctions, it is
not necessary to wait and see the effects of LAWA prior to deciding
whether it is conflict preempted.
The Tenth Circuit's implied preemption analysis was also superior
because it placed appropriate weight on the goals of IRCA in arriving at
the conclusion that Section 9 stood as an obstacle to the implementation
of the regulatory scheme and was therefore conflict preempted. In enact-
ing IRCA, Congress manifested a clear intent to create a comprehensive
and overarching regulatory scheme and corresponding civil and criminal
penalties.208 Even assuming that LAWA did fall under the savings clause,
the penalties imposed run counter to the enumerated penalties of IRCA,
and therefore, there was a considerable likelihood that LAWA could
expose an employer to federal liability by following the letter of Arizona
law. For example, by filing quarterly reports on all new hires during the
probationary period, an employer could come in conflict with the rule
203. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
204. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 856.
205. Id. at 867.
206. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 769 (10th Cir. 2010).
207. Id. at 751.
208. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210-12 (3d Cir. 2010).
2011] 395
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW V
under IRCA preventing employers from asking employees for additional
documentation. Additionally, having an employer file an affidavit stating
he has fired all illegal employees, and that he will not hire other illegal
workers on pain of permanent loss of a business license, could likely lead
to firing and hiring decisions based on race or national origin, which is
obviously a discriminatory practice in violation of the goals of IRCA and
other federal laws. Furthermore, in signing LAWA, then Arizona Gover-
nor Napolitano noted that it was problematic that the bill lacked "an an-
tidiscrimination clause to ensure that it is enforced in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner." 209
Besides potential federal liability, LAWA places other burdens on
business owners. Minor burdens include asking employees for additional
documentation and requiring employers to sign affidavits. More signifi-
cantly, the Ninth Circuit wrongly discounted the plaintiffs' argument that
LAWA was impliedly preempted because the permanent revocation of a
business license is far more severe than IRCA sanctions and therefore it
conflicts with IRCA's goals. 210 Other licensing laws, with lesser penal-
ties, may not interfere with the goals of IRCA's sanctioning scheme, but
LAWA, by permanently revoking a business's license, imposes the ulti-
mate burden on employers: the loss of livelihood. In finding Section 9 of
the Oklahoma Act conflict preempted, the Tenth Circuit placed great
weight on the employer's burden to verify the work authorization of in-
dependent contractors. 211 The Edmondson court stated that the risk of
increased employee discrimination and employer burdens under "Section
9 . . . upsets Congress' carefully constructed balance by interfering with
its chosen methods."212 Clearly, both these dangers are present in
LAWA.
These types of situations raise serious conflict preemption concerns,
yet the Chicanos court limited its conflict preemption analysis and in-
voked Geier only to analyze the mandatory use of E-Verify,213 which is
not conflict preempted. In Geier, the Court took into account all of
DOT's goals in enacting FMVSS 208, but in Chicanos the Ninth Circuit
only considered the goal of preventing unauthorized workers. Ignoring
the goals of preventing employment discrimination and minimizing the
burden on employers resulted in an analysis that was overly simplistic.
Having wrongly ignored the two foregoing goals, the court's analysis
then flowed logically-LAWA was not expressly preempted based on
the savings clause as it was a licensing law, and LAWA did not stand as
an obstacle to accomplishing IRCA's goal of preventing unauthorized
209. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & Immigration
Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1716 (2009).
210. See Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 867.
211. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 769.
212. Id.
213. Chicanos, 558 F.3d at 866-67.
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workers, and therefore, it was not impliedly preempted. This contrived
conclusion, however, contradicts long established federal preemption
jurisprudence that "has repeatedly declined to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme estab-
lished by federal law .... "2 14 And it is undisputed that IRCA is a "care-
ful regulatory scheme." Unless the courts undertake a meaningful im-
plied preemption analysis subsequent to an express preemption analysis,
states and municipalities will be able to essentially supplement or bypass
IRCA entirely by labeling employment verification laws as licensing
laws in order to fall within the savings clause.2 15
C. Edmondson, Chicanos, and Lozano: The Implications for State Immi-
gration Laws and Federal Lawmaking
By enacting LAWA, then Governor Napolitano hoped to pressure
the federal government into addressing immigration through more effec-
tive legislation.216 It is argued that by enacting their own immigration
laws states will pressure Congress to reform federal immigration laws,
and this reform will lead to greater and much needed state and federal
cooperation on immigration.217 Additionally, because the federal courts
have upheld these two immigration laws, at least in part, this will likely
motivate other states to pass similar legislation. Some municipalities and
states have already enacted similar legislation, but with mixed results. 218
The longer Congress waits before enacting new, improved legislation the
more challenges to state immigration laws will be decided in the courts
and the more varied these laws will become.
As more states enact new work authorization statutes, it raises an in-
teresting question. Will Congress base new legislation on successful state
statutes, or will courts strip away so much of each state law that none
will prove to be effective? In the past the courts have allowed states to
operate as small laboratories for developing new and innovative solu-
tions to the problems they face.219 The courts, however, are resistant to
allow states to continue to function as laboratories in areas of tradition-
ally federal law.220 One of the dangers of allowing states to enact their
own immigration laws is that the variety of enforcement approaches
taken could result in a "thousand borders," which would certainly be
problematic.221 For example, varied state work authorization laws could
214. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
215. See Shelley, supra note 1, at 616-17.
216. Id. at 633.
217. Id. at 637.
218. Id. at 632-33.
219. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220. See id. (majority opinion) (holding that regulation of marijuana under the Controlled
Substances Act is solely within the power of the federal government because of the Commerce
Clause).
221. Nchimunya D. Ndulo, State Employer Sanctions, Laws and the Federal Preemption
Doctrine: The Legal Arizona Workers Act Revisited, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 866
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make it very difficult for nationwide businesses to comply in their hiring
practices. This could pose a significant disruption to businesses as they
face more and more complex immigration laws with potentially harsh
penalties for non-compliance. Also, approaches taken by states to combat
illegal immigration could result in racial profiling.22 2 Federal immigra-
tion officers receive extensive training, including courses in immigration
and nationality law, but many states lack the funds necessary to provide
state agencies with similar training.2 23 This lack of training may force
state officers to rely on racial profiling to enforce state laws, and un-
doubtedly in communities where anti-immigrant sentiment already ex-
ists, this practice will be exacerbated. 2 24 Therefore, the courts' determina-
tion as to who has the power to regulate work authorization, the states or
the federal government, is important to the future of state legislation in
the area of immigration.
If the Supreme Court were to follow the implied preemption ap-
proach taken in Chicanos, which narrowly viewed obstacle preemption
in favor of more emphasis on express preemption, there could be signifi-
cant consequences as a result in this shift of the federal preemption para-
digm. 225 For example, if more emphasis is placed on express preemption
it may force more positive law making at the federal level.22 6 Congress
will be required to put more thought into considering the burdens and
benefits of a particular piece of legislation if it intends the law to preempt
contrary state enactments.227 One drawback to this approach is Congress
already conducts extensive hearings when crafting policy, and spending
more time and money on any one piece of legislation will draw resources
from other matters. Furthermore, it is not always feasible, or even possi-
ble, to predict all the consequences of a law. Therefore, it will be diffi-
cult, in some cases impossible, to draft express preemption provisions
that account for all possibilities.
Another possible consequence of increased reliance on express pre-
emption is that states would then be free to enact worker authorization
statutes where employers are strictly liable for hiring unauthorized work-
ers. Without implied preemption, states could simply label their worker
authorization laws as licensing laws, and then they would be free to im-
pose any penalties they felt appropriate. Penalties could range from revo-
cation of business licenses, like in LAWA, to increased costs for license
renewal for those who have hired unauthorized workers in the past.
(2009) (quoting Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 995
(2004)).
222. Ndulo, supra note 221, at 879.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 209, at 1714.
226. Id. at 1713-14.
227. Id. at 1723.
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Without the "reasonableness" safe harbor of IRCA, employers faced with
a law based on strict liability would surely discriminate against those
who appear Hispanic, or who speak English as a second language. 228 In
addition to this increased motivation to discriminate, employers would
also face a greater disruption of business. This disruption would occur
not only through the imposition of penalties, but as illegal immigration
and the use of fraudulent documents continue to rise, it is exceedingly
difficult for an employer to be absolutely certain that it is hiring an
authorized worker. When faced with a strict liability offense, employers
will surely use all means available to avoid penalties, including discrimi-
nation and extending additional resources to verify the work eligibility of
employees. Additionally, if the Court was to narrowly interpret conflict
preemption, it would represent a shift in the balance of power between
states and the federal government; states in the absence of a detailed ex-
press preemption provision would be free to craft their own immigration
laws, which would likely vary considerably from state to state.229
IV. CONCLUSION
Chicanos and Edmondson reveal significantly different approaches
to federal preemption. Edmondson faithfully applied accepted principles
of federal preemption, balancing states' rights and the goals of IRCA.
Alternatively, Chicanos was not consistent with federal preemption
precedent, and represented a shift toward increased reliance on express
preemption language. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Chica-
nos,230 and oral arguments were heard on December 8, 2010.231 The
Court's decision will surely have long standing consequences for immi-
gration and employment in the United States, and perhaps even for pre-
emption doctrine more generally.
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